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Abstract 
 
Confidence in decision making is an important dimension of managerial behavior. 
However, what is the relation between confidence, on the one hand, and the fact of 
receiving or expecting to receive feedback on decisions taken, on the other hand? To 
explore this and related issues in the context of everyday decision making, use was 
made of the ESM (Experience Sampling Method) to sample decisions taken by 
undergraduates and business executives. For several days, participants received 4 or 5 
SMS messages daily (on their mobile telephones) at random moments at which point 
they completed brief questionnaires about their current decision making activities. 
Issues considered here include differences between the types of decisions faced by the 
two groups, their structure, feedback (received and expected), and confidence in 
decisions taken as well as in the validity of feedback. No relation was found between 
confidence in decisions and whether participants received or expected to receive 
feedback on those decisions. In addition, although participants are clearly aware that 
feedback can provide both “confirming” and “disconfirming” evidence, their ability to 
specify appropriate feedback is imperfect. Finally, difficulties experienced in using 
the ESM are discussed as are possibilities for further research using this methodology. 
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chapter, we look at this issue from two viewpoints.  First, we question the manner in 
which we – as scientists – sample the environments of the experimental participants 
who engage in the judgment and decision making tasks that we study.  To what extent 
are these samples representative of the natural decision making ecology that our 
participants face in their everyday lives?  Second, by actually sampling people’s 
activities in their natural ecologies, we seek to characterize how they experience these 
environments.  In particular, we investigate how one feature of environments (the 
presence or absence of feedback) affects inferences (the confidence people express in 
their decisions). 
The first question is, of course, not new.  For many years, psychologists have 
been concerned about how to generalize behavior from experimental evidence (see, 
e.g., Brunswik, 1956; Chapanis, 1961; 1967; Cronbach, 1975; Ebbesen & Konečni, 
1980; Hammond, 1978; Hogarth, 1986; Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001).   I 
do not propose to add to this debate. Instead, the contribution is to demonstrate how 
the use of readily available technology can greatly facilitate random sampling of 
decision behavior outside the psychological laboratory.  Indeed, as I shall argue 
below, obtaining appropriate samples of human decision behavior is not as difficult as 
might be imagined by researchers trained within experimental paradigms.  
The intellectual stimulus for this work was a study reported by Egon Brunswik 
in 1944 and the development of the experience  sampling method or ESM by 
Ciskszentmihalyi and others (see Brunswik, 1944; Ciskszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987; 
Hurlburt, 1997).  Briefly stated, this chapter reports a study of the decision behavior 
of two groups of people, business executives and students.  For several days, 
participants received 4 or 5 SMS messages (on their mobile telephones) at random 
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decision making activities.  With this methodology, therefore, it was possible to 
achieve random samples of each participant’s decision behavior although, of course, 
no claim can be made that the participants themselves were anything other than 
“convenience” samples of their respective populations, that is, business executives 
and students.  
The samples of decisions obtained by the ESM can be used to infer the 
characteristics of people’s decision environments.  This, in turn, can be used to 
address our second issue that deals with how such characteristics affect the inferences 
that people make.  To do this, we focus on the issue of confidence and ask how one 
aspect of environments – namely the presence or absence of feedback – affects the 
confidence that people express in their decisions.   
The issue of whether people exhibit appropriate confidence in their judgments 
has attracted much attention in the decision making literature.    Here, the key concept 
has been calibration, that is, do people’s assessments of uncertainty match empirical 
relative frequencies? For example, do events that are assessed subjectively as 
occurring, say, 65% of times actually occur 65% of times, and so on?  Early findings 
suggested that people are overconfident, that is, their assessments of probabilities of 
target events are systematically higher than empirical relative frequencies (see, e.g., 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982).  However, these experimental findings 
have been challenged as researchers have shown, inter alia, differential effects of 
some realistic task environments (Murphy & Winkler, 1984), framing questions in 
terms of frequencies as opposed to probabilities (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & 
Kleinbölting, 1991), “hard” and “easy” questions (Harvey, 1997; Juslin, 1993), and 
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binary choices (Klayman, Soll, González-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999).  
More importantly, Gigerenzer et al. (1991) adopted a Bruswikian perspective 
and demonstrated how the representative sampling of questions from people’s natural 
environments led to judgments of confidence that were well calibrated.  In addition,  
Juslin and his colleagues have made a careful examination of how many other 
experimental tasks have been sampled and have demonstrated that non-representative 
sampling of items could account for much overconfidence (Juslin, 1994; Juslin, 
Winman, & Olsson, 2000). In other words, if research on this topic had sought to 
sample tasks in the ecologically valid manner advocated by Brunswik (1956), 
“overconfidence” might not be considered such an important issue in behavioral 
decision making as it is today (see, e.g., Russo & Schoemaker, 2002).  
The calibration paradigm tests people’s ability to express their confidence in 
probabilistic form for particular events or classes of events.  However, it does not 
address the more general issue of whether people feel confident in their everyday 
decision making activities and, if so, whether these feelings are justified.   
Nonetheless, in terms of behavior, such feelings are important.  They affect how 
individuals feel and act; and they can also influence others. In the workplace, for 
example, the confidence expressed by one party (e.g., a boss or a salesman) may 
determine whether a decision is implemented (e.g., to undertake an action or buy a 
product). 
Some 25 years ago, Einhorn and I (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978) addressed the 
issue of confidence in judgment from a theoretical perspective.  We noted that the 
structure of many decision making tasks in the real world is such that people either do 
not receive feedback on their decisions or, if feedback is received, it can be 
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how well new employees perform in their jobs, managers clearly receive feedback on 
their hiring decisions.  However, this feedback is incomplete because, by hiring some 
applicants but not others, there is no feedback concerning the performance of rejected 
candidates. In addition, the very act of hiring may engender self-fulfilling prophecies 
with respect to “successful” candidates.  The theoretical implication is that people’s 
general confidence in their decision making abilities can be continually reinforced by 
the fact that many of their actions involve positively biased or even no feedback (with 
the latter being interpreted as “no news is good news”).  Subsequent experiments by 
Camerer (1981) and Schwartz (1982) supported this analysis. (For related ideas and 
evidence, see Fiedler, 2000). 
Einhorn and I subsequently refined these ideas by characterizing environments 
in which erroneous beliefs might be created and maintained by distorted or even 
missing feedback. Einhorn (1980) referred to outcome irrelevant learning structures or 
OILS.  More recently (Hogarth, 2001), in reviewing how people develop “good” and 
“bad” intuitions, I introduced the notion that the environments in which people 
acquire such knowledge can be classified as “kind” or “wicked” according to whether 
the feedback they receive is or is not veridical (i.e., accurate).
 1 
This chapter addresses the relation between decision making and confidence in 
people’s natural decision making environments.  Specifically, is there a relation 
between the confidence that people express in their decisions and the feedback that 
they either receive or expect to receive?   The data reported are generated by a novel 
methodology for research on decision making inspired by Brunswik’s (1944) study of 
“size constancy.”
2 (See also Hoffrage & Hertwig, this volume.) In this study, 
Brunswik arranged for a person (a student) to be followed by an associate for 
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Berkeley) over a period of four weeks.  The participant was instructed to behave in 
her normal fashion but was asked – at irregular moments – by the associate to 
estimate the sizes of objects in her visual field when interrupted as well as the 
distance from the objects.  The associate then measured the objects and distances. 
Note, that in this study the “experimenter” did not manipulate or choose the objects 
about which the participant made judgments, that is, the “experimental tasks.”   
Instead, these were selected in a manner such that the objects of the participant’s 
judgments constituted a random sample of tasks in her natural environment.  Thus, 
although this study involved but a single participant, valid inferences could be made 
about the “size constancy” that she exhibited.  
Briefly stated, Brunswik’s point was that the environments of psychological 
experiments distort reality because participants are asked to act or make judgments in 
situations that have been artificially created by manipulating variables in some 
orthogonal, factorial manner. Instead, Brunswik argued, many variables in the real 
world are correlated to some extent and people learn to deal with a variety of 
situations as opposed to isolated incidents that have been created by an experimenter.  
Thus, if you want to know how people “do something” in the real world, you need to 
sample situations from the environments (or real worlds) in which they actually live.  
This chapter exploits the ESM to explore issues of confidence in decisions as 
well as the kind of feedback people receive and expect on the decisions they take.      
Specifically, studies were conducted with two distinct populations, business 
executives and students. However, to gain more insight into estimates of behavior 
generated by the ESM, a retrospective questionnaire was also administered in which 
another group of student respondents was asked to summarize aspects of their 
  7decision making activities over the two preceding weeks.
3  This requested aggregate 
level estimates of characteristics of decision making activities that corresponded to 
the questions that participants in the ESM studies answered for all the specific 
decisions on which they reported.     
The retrospective questionnaire was motivated by methodological and 
substantive concerns.  First, there is evidence that retrospective reports of events 
differ from data concerning the same events collected at the time the events actually 
occurred (see, e.g., Ericsson & Simon, 1984; McFarlane, Martin, & Williams, 1988). 
To what extent, therefore, would estimates of behavior obtained by ESM differ from 
retrospective reports?  Moreover, in what way would they differ?  Second, within the 
calibration paradigm (see above), people have been shown to exhibit less confidence 
in judgments when these are viewed within the framework of a series of judgments as 
opposed to considering each judgment separately (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & 
Kleinbölting, 1991).  Does this finding generalize to feelings that people have about 
confidence in the decisions they take (i.e., retrospective reports vs. confidence 
expressed when deciding)?  
The chapter is organized as follows.  I first describe the participants in the 
study and the methodology.  Specific questions centered on the kinds of decisions 
taken on an ongoing basis; the extent to which these decisions are repeated frequently 
or are unique; confidence expressed that decisions are “right;” whether people receive 
or expect to receive feedback on the appropriateness of their decisions; the kind of 
feedback and its timing relative to the moment of decision; and confidence as to 
whether the feedback is or will be appropriate.  
Next, I present results of the study.  To summarize, people – both students and 
executives – express considerable confidence in the decisions they take on a daily 
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these decisions.  They are also quite confident in the quality of feedback (when 
received) and are well aware that this can lead to disconfirming the validity of their 
actions. As could be expected, executives and students differ in the kinds of decisions 
they face, both in terms of content and structure.  For student populations, the data 
collected retrospectively differs significantly from that collected by the ESM.  In 
particular, reported confidence in decisions as well as relative presence of feedback 
are larger when estimated in retrospect than from data gathered concurrently.   
Finally, I discuss the results of the study in terms of both methodology and 
substance. As to the former, the ESM is clearly a useful adjunct to a decision 
researcher’s toolbox and will become even more powerful when used in conjunction 
with more traditional methodologies.  In terms of substance, the study emphasizes the 
importance of characterizing habitual behavior or routines that affect the cumulative 
consequences of the many decisions we take each day.    
Participants 
  Three groups of participants participated in the ESM studies. Two groups were 
composed of business executives. The third group consisted of students at Universitat 
Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, Spain.  A further group of students at the same university 
completed the retrospective questionnaire concerning decisions made in the two 
preceding weeks. 
The executives. The first group of executives was recruited by email notices 
sent by the president of the local alumni club of an executive MBA program in 
Barcelona that requested volunteers to participate in a study organized by the author 
(who actually knew many of the potential participants).  However, not many details of 
the study were announced except that participants would be required to respond to 
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participation, potential respondents were promised feedback on the study.  Twenty 
managers volunteered to participate.  However, data were only received from 13.  
Two executives explicitly replied that they had been unable to participate (one 
because of technical problems with his telephone); no data – or even any responses – 
were received from five other executives and it can only be presumed that they 
experienced difficulty in complying with the study’s requirements and so gave up on 
the task. Of the 13 executives who responded, ten were male and three were female.  
Their ages varied between 30 and 45.  Most of the executives worked in the Barcelona 
area except for two who were in Madrid, one in Mallorca, and one in another 
European country.  
Following a brief presentation by the author, the second group of executives 
was recruited at an executive education program at CEDEP in Fontainebleau, France. 
These executives were similar in age and other demographic characteristics to the first 
group except that they worked in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom.  Responses were subsequently received from 11 of the 16 executives who 
had expressed an interest in the study. A difference between the first and second 
groups of executives was that, in the second group, the executives were only asked to 
participate in the study for one week, that is, five working days.  The decision to 
reduce the length of participation reflected the difficulties experienced by the first 
group of executives. As with the first group, participants were promised feedback on 
the study.
4     
The students. Eleven students (ten undergraduates and one graduate student)   
responded to advertisements placed on notice boards on campus. These stated that the 
task would take approximately 30 minutes each day during two weeks and that 
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have access to mobile telephones capable of receiving SMS messages.  On 
completion of the experiment, the participants were paid 40 euros and were debriefed 
as to the purposes of the study.  The median age of the undergraduates was 20 (range 
of 19 to 21); the graduate student was 28; there were two males and nine females.  
The responses of one participant (a 19-year old male) were excluded from analysis 
because it was deemed that they had not been completed with sufficient care.  
Respondents for the retrospective questionnaire were recruited after an 
undergraduate class at Universitat Pompeu Fabra.  The 25 volunteer respondents had 
a median age of 21. There were 11 females and 14 males.  They were paid 5 euros 
each for completing the questionnaire, a task that took between 20 and 30 minutes.  
Since the responses of males and females did not differ significantly, they were 
pooled for the purpose of analysis. 
Method 
  The student participants were asked to keep their mobile telephones “on” from 
9 am to 9 pm each day, Monday through Saturday, for a period of two weeks (12 
days).  They were told that, each day, they would receive approximately five SMS 
text messages at random moments between 9 am and 9 pm.  Each time they received a 
message, they were asked to complete a short questionnaire in respect of the most 
recent “decision action” they had taken. (See below.) Messages followed a standard 
format, for example, “Message #2 – Robin” would signal that this was the second 
message being sent on that day. The procedure for the executive participants was the 
same except that messages were only sent on Mondays through Fridays and between 
9 am and 7 pm.   
  11To send the messages each day, time (9 am to 9 pm or 9 am to 7 pm) was 
divided into 10-minute segments and random numbers were assigned to the segments.  
The segments corresponding to the five largest numbers were the time intervals 
during which the messages were sent.  In a few cases, I failed to send messages and 
thus participants did not receive exactly five messages each day.  The messages were 
sent over the internet using commercially available messaging services provided by 
mobile telephone operators.  Forty-eight messages were sent to the first group of 
executives; and between 20 and 24 messages were sent to the second group. Sixty or 
61 messages were sent to the students (not all started the study on the same day). 
The first group of executives received all instructions and questionnaires in 
written form through email and returned either hard or electronic versions of the 
questionnaires. A package of all materials was given to the second group of 
executives including an addressed envelope to facilitate returns. English was the sole 
language used with the executives. (At least seven respondents were English-native 
speakers and all had studied or were studying management courses in English.) The 
student participants were given verbal instructions (in Spanish) and written 
instructions (in English) and provided with questionnaire forms to complete and 
return to the author.  The questionnaires were in English but almost all student 
participants responded in Spanish.   
Instructions asked participants to focus on what were called “decision actions” 
(or DAs).
5  These were defined as “any decision or judgment that you make.”   
Moreover, it was emphasized that these could vary from important to trivial and that, 
from the viewpoint of the study, it did not matter whether the DAs involved “large” or 
“small” consequences.  Participants were further instructed to focus on the DA that 
was “closest in time to the moment that you receive the SMS message.”  Since it was 
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day, instructions to this group specified “If on reconnecting your mobile telephone 
you find a message, please act as though the message had just been sent, that is, 
assume that the message was sent just before you reconnected your telephone.”  At 
one level, this procedure could have produced a small bias in random sampling of 
decisions; on the other hand, it was designed to reduce distortions due to faulty 
memory. 
The object of the questionnaire administered to the second group of students 
was to obtain retrospective estimates of the aggregate features of the data that had 
been collected from the first group of students on a concurrent basis.  Thus, the 
questionnaire explicitly asked respondents to limit their estimates to the two 
preceding weeks, specifically, Mondays through Saturdays, from 9 am to 9 pm.  The 
questionnaire also emphasized that all decisions, including the trivial, should be 
considered.   
To illustrate the manner in which the questions were asked, consider the 
question in the ESM studies about confidence in decisions.  Here, participants were 
asked to state for each decision taken “How confident are you that you took the ‘right’ 
decision?”  Responses were made by checking one of five levels: “Very confident,” 
“Confident,” “Somewhat confident,” “Not confident,” and “Not at all confident.”  In 
the retrospective questionnaire, respondents were asked “Of all the decisions that you 
took, what percentages of times could you express the following levels of confidence 
that you had taken the ‘right’ decision?”  Responses were made by assigning 
percentage estimates to each of the five levels listed above (using exactly the same 
words).  Below we refer to the responses of the questionnaire study as the “student 
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student data can be assessed.
6         
 
Results 
Responses. As noted above, valid responses for the ESM studies were received 
from 24 executives and 10 students. The executives provided analyzable responses for 
613 of 876 messages sent, that is, 70%.  However, there was considerable variation in 
individual response rates from 15% to 100%. The median was 85%.  One could 
exclude the responses of those executives who provided few responses; however, 
there is no reason to believe that their responses were any more or less valid than 
those who gave many responses. Executives who submitted few responses simply 
stated that they had difficulty completing all requests for data.   
The response rate from the students was much higher. In total, the students 
gave responses to 585 of the 605 messages sent to them, that is, 97%. The median 
response rate per student was 98%. Given that the methodology interrupted their daily 
life at unpredictable moments, this is a highly satisfactory response rate.  
Across both populations, there were approximately 1,200 decisions to analyze.     
In the questionnaire study, all 25 participants provided usable data.  
Checks on data.  Participants were asked to record both the time at which they 
received the SMS messages and the time at which the decisions they reported took 
place.  Deviations between the former and the time at which the messages were sent 
provide a check on whether messages were being received at the appropriate 
moments.  Checks between the time messages were received and the time reported 
decisions took place are important because the smaller the gap between these two 
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distortions in memory. (Recall participants were asked to report on decisions that 
immediately preceded the receipt of messages.)   
For the 24 executives, the median times between sending messages and the 
recording of these varied between 1 and 46 minutes with an overall median (by 
participant) of 5 minutes.  Thus, the executives did not always report receiving the 
messages when they were sent. The main reason was that several executives were not 
able to maintain their mobile telephones in a ready state but only consulted them from 
time to time.  (This was a result, for example, of air travel or attending important 
meetings.) For all but one of the student participants, the analogous median times 
were only 1 or 2 minutes. (The outlier was 10 minutes.)  The students clearly received 
the messages when they were sent. 
Given the goals of the study, the more important deviation is between the 
moments that messages were received and when reported decisions were taken. For 
the executives, individual median times varied between 0 and 35 minutes with an 
overall median of 14 minutes. For the individual student participants, the median 
deviation varied from 4 to 35 minutes with an overall median (across participants) of 
9 minutes.   
ESM questionnaire results.  Each ESM questionnaires posed 11 questions. 
Two questions simply asked for the date and time. Six required quantitative responses 
(e.g., estimates of time or checking one of several possible answers).  And for three 
questions, participants had to write descriptions. These involved what the participants 
were doing when they received the messages, a description of the most recent 
“decision action” that they had taken, and an explanation of the feedback (if any) that 
they would receive on their decisions (see also below). 
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accepting what participants had written at face value (i.e., if a participant wrote about 
a decision in a particular way, it was assumed that was how she or he had actually 
perceived the situation); and second, developing a coding scheme to classify 
responses in a consistent manner.  Coding involved three tasks. One was to classify 
what respondents were currently doing and the domain of activity to which specific 
decision actions applied.  Categories for classification were created after reading all 
questionnaire responses and examining categories used in previous ESM studies (in 
particular, Sjöberg & Magneberg, 1990).  The second task concerned the structure of 
each decision. This was analyzed in terms of the number of alternatives stated or 
implied and whether the decision was positively or negatively framed.  The third task, 
the explanation of feedback, was classified as to whether it could be considered 
confirming, disconfirming, or possibly both. The schema used for analysis is 
discussed in greater detail below (see results concerning feedback). 
All data were coded independently by two research assistants who were 
ignorant of the author’s expectations for the study. For each qualitative question, the 
assistants recorded their level of agreement and then discussed all disagreements until 
they reached consensus.  (Where appropriate, I report the initial level of agreement 
between the two coders.)  In what follows, the data are primarily presented in 
aggregate form contrasting the total responses of the executives, on the one hand, and 
the students, on the other.
 Although there are variations in responses by individuals, 
the mean aggregate responses (of both executives and students) are almost identical to 
the mean responses of individuals in each group.
7   
Finally, in the tables presenting the data, I have included responses of the 
“student controls.” These are the responses of the 25 participants in the retrospective 
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activities over the two preceding weeks (9 am to 9 pm, Mondays through Saturdays). 
Current activities and domains of decisions. When they received messages, 
participants were asked to record what they were doing (their “current activity”) as 
well as to describe their most recent decision or “DA.”  Table 22.1 presents 
classifications of both current activities and the domains of most recent decisions
8 – 
for executives and students, separately, with the data of the “student controls” 
appearing on the right hand side of the student data.
     
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 22.1 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
The data show, first, that the domains in which decisions are taken are closely 
related to current activities (as one would suspect).  Second, there are both similarities 
and differences in what the executives and students are doing and the domains of their 
decisions. For both, about one-third of their activities involve their lives as business 
people or students (“basic occupation”) with the executives making somewhat more 
decisions than students in this category (36% vs. 30%). On the other hand, whereas 
19% of executives’ decisions involve “professional communication” (the second most 
important category), the analogous figure for students is a mere 2%.  Indeed, if the 
categories of basic occupation and professional communciation are summed, it is 
clear that the executives are involved in many more work-related activities than the 
students (i.e., 55% vs. 32%).     
As to further differences, “sleep, rest, and recreation” are quite high on the 
students’ list but low on that of the executives. In addition, if we add to this category 
the activities and decisions devoted to “eating and drinking,” it is clear that these 
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decisions as opposed to 13%). Interestingly, between 10% and 15% of the decisions 
of both groups lie in the domain “housework, personal time and funds management.” 
(For other studies that describe people’s activities across time using the ESM, see 
Sjöberg & Magneberg, 1990.) 
Pre-testing of the retrospective questionnaires revealed that respondents would 
probably not be able to distinguish differences in estimates of the time they had spent 
in different activities and the domains in which they took decisions. Thus, they were 
only asked to estimate percentages of time spent on different activities. The 
distribution across activities shown in Table 22.1 under “Activities of controls” (lower 
right hand column) differs from the distribution of current activities reported by the 
ESM students in that the former is less skewed than the latter.
9   
Action types. Decisions can be described in many different ways.  Above, I 
reported the content or domain of decisions. Here, I consider their structure. 
Specifically, each decision was defined as belonging to one of three different “action 
types.”  The first is a straightforward situation where someone decides “to do” as 
opposed “not to do” something.  What is not done is unspecified and the description 
of the decision focuses only on what is to be done. As an example, consider a decision 
described as “to have a cup of coffee.”  Note that the formulation of this decision has 
a positive focus.  In the second action type, we consider the decision “not” to do 
something, such as “not to have a cup of coffee.”  This is a negative focus.  The third 
action type reflects more complex decisions with multiple alternatives. An example is 
“to have a cup of coffee or to have a cup of tea.” More complicated examples could 
include “deciding on a schedule of activities” or “making a list of priorities.”  These 
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negation of a single action. 
Table 22.2 reports some characteristics of the data including “action type” 
distinguishing between responses of students and executives.  Actions with a positive 
focus dominate those with a negative focus for both groups of participants. Indeed, 
the relative lack of decisions with a negative focus is striking.  As to the third action 
type, executives clearly see more specific alternatives than students, 36% vs. 16%. 
 
However, of particular interest here is the individual variability amongst executives. 
Whereas for 13 (out of 24) respondents, this figure is less than 15%, for 6 it is greater 
than 50% (including 3 more than 95%).     
………………………………………… 
Insert Table 22.2 about here 
………………………………………… 
Orientation. Respondents were asked whether their decisions were 
professional or private. As might be expected, the percentage of private responses was 
higher for the students than the executives.  Indeed, it is surprising that the students 
should have such a low proportion of professional responses (24%) when so many of 
their activities were centered on their studies (see Table 22.1). Similarly, although the 
executives were mainly at work, they perceived 36% of their decisions as being 
private in nature. 
Frequency. To what extent does decision making involve frequently occurring 
or new activities?  Here students and executives had somewhat different responses 
with executives reporting somewhat less frequently occurring events. (Transforming 
the questionnaire responses to a 1-5 scale and testing the difference in means leads to 
a t-statistic of 2.04, p < .05). Students classified 23% of decisions as being taken 
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There must, of course, be some doubt as to whether these latter figures represent an 
accurate assessment of decisions that are taken “automatically” since, almost by 
definition, people may not be aware of taking such decisions (see, e.g., Hogarth, 
2001).  On the other hand, roughly one fifth to one quarter of all decisions fell into the 
categories of being done “rarely” or for “the first time.”  
Confidence in the “right” decision. Overall, confidence that the “right” 
decision was taken was high.  For both students and executives, the categories of 
“very confident” and “confident” were checked in almost 70% of cases and relatively 
few responses indicated lack of confidence. Interestingly, one respondent alone 
accounted for almost 50% of the students’ responses to the last two categories (“not 
confident” and “not at all confident”) and when this participant’s responses are 
omitted, the data for the students and executives are more similar.
10 Below, I analyze 
the correlates of confidence and comment further on these findings. 
Finally, the retrospective data of the student controls indicate more confidence 
that the “right” decisions had been taken than the responses of the students in the 
ESM study (76% vs. 66% when summing the “very confident” and “confident” 
categories). In other words, the data suggest that overall assessments, based on 
memory, involve a greater sense of confidence than the aggregation of estimates 
expressed at the time events occurred.  This finding runs contrary to what would be 
predicted from evidence in the calibration literature where overall confidence 
expressed for a series of events has been found to be less than that obtained by 
aggregating the confidence levels expressed for each of the events (Gigerenzer, 
Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991).   
  20Feedback.  Table 22.3 reports data concerning feedback.  In light of a pilot 
study, the ESM questionnaire did not explicitly use the word “feedback.” Instead, 
respondents were asked “Will you ever know whether you took the ‘right’ decision or 
do you already know?” with the response categories being “Yes” or “No.”  Following 
“Yes” responses, participants were requested to answer three questions: (1) “When 
will you know (please express as the length of time between taking the DA and the 
moment of knowing)?” (2) “Please explain how you know or will know.” (3) “How 
confident can you be in this explanation?” (This latter question had five possible 
responses – see Table 22.3.) 
……………………………………………………… 
Insert Table 22.3 about here 
……………………………………………………... 
Overall, students and executives report that some 52% to 65% of decisions are 
accompanied by feedback or expected feedback.  (There was considerable variation in 
student responses but differences are not statistically significant. In particular, two 
students reported lack of feedback in 85% and more of cases; the largest comparable 
figure for any executive was 71%.) In addition, both executives and students express 
high levels of confidence in the accuracy of the feedback they receive or expect to 
receive (see foot of Table 22.3).  
Where the executives and students differ is in the timing of feedback following 
action.  Both groups do receive some feedback immediately after taking actions (32% 
and 20% in less than 2 minutes). Here, however, the similarity ends. Whereas, within 
45 minutes students receive feedback on 55% of occasions, the analogous figure for 
executives is 29%.  As to feedback received after a week, the figures are 20% and 
35% for students and executives, respectively. In addition, in 10% of the cases the 
timing of feedback for executives is indeterminate, that is, it is unclear from their 
  21descriptions when this feedback will be received, if at all. At the individual level, 14 
of the 24 executives reported that at least 40% of their feedback would only be 
received after one week or was indeterminate, whereas this was true of only one of the 
10 students. 
The student controls differ from their ESM counterparts in that they claimed 
that they received much more feedback (70% vs. 52%) and the distribution of this 
feedback was more spread out in time (e.g., the median time for the student controls 
to receive feedback after taking decisions was between “90 minutes to 3 hours.” For 
the ESM student participants, this median was between “15 and 45 minutes”). As to 
confidence in the feedback itself, the ESM participants express greater confidence 
than the student controls (74% vs. 67%). 
What type of feedback do people receive and expect?  Participants were asked 
to “explain how you know or will know” that the “right” decision had been taken.  
For both cases, participants’ responses were classified according to a 2 x 2 table that 
has often been used to describe the relations between actions or beliefs and types of 
feedback.  This is reproduced here as Figure 22.1.  
The rows of Figure 22.1 represent actions taken and their alternatives; the 
columns distinguish between feedback that can be thought of as, alternatively, 
confirming and disconfirming the “correctness” or “appropriateness” of actions taken.  
Cell  a represents the conjunction of taking the action and observing/expecting 
confirming evidence (that the “right” decision was taken); cell b the conjunction of 
taking the action and observing evidence that it was not the right decision (i.e., 
disconfirming evidence); cell c is the conjunction of not taking the action but seeing 
evidence that would have confirmed that the action should have been taken; and cell d 
is the conjunction of not taking the action and evidence that would have shown it to 
  22be inappropriate. Of course, “not taking the action” also includes taking another 
explicit action when alternatives have been made explicit. As seen previously in Table 
22.2 above, most decisions had a simple, positive focus even though there were 
differences between executives and students as to the extent to which alternative 
actions were specified (i.e., simple negations vs. multiple alternatives).  
………………………………………………………… 
Insert Figure 22.1 and Table 22.4 about here 
………………………………………………………… 
Table 22.4 provides a classification of the types of feedback received or 
expected. The analysis distinguishes between feedback that has been or is being 
received (labeled “current”) and feedback that had not yet been received (labeled 
“expected”).  Consistent with the fact that the executives received or expected to 
receive feedback later than the students (relative to when decisions were taken), the 
students report more current feedback than the executives (32% vs. 15%) and 
correspondingly, less expected feedback.  
The predominant type of feedback for both students and executives – and for 
both time periods – involves cells a and b, either separately or as a conjunction.  
Indeed, there are relatively few instances that involve other cells.  The classification 
“unobservable” covers cases where participants stated that they would receive or had 
received feedback but, as far as could be determined from what they had written, 
these simply represented beliefs for which no evidence was forthcoming. Of particular 
interest for expected feedback is that participants were often acutely aware that their 
decisions could be wrong and expressed this by describing feedback in terms of both 
cells a and b or cells c and d. Indeed, 56% of expected feedback of the executives 
refers to both cells a and b (for students this figure is 36%).   
  23To seek insight into when participants are more likely to expect “a or b cell 
feedback,” I regressed the corresponding percentage responses for all ESM 
participants on different combinations of percentage responses to other questions as 
well as a dummy variable to distinguish executives and students. This analysis 
revealed positive significant effects for executives vs. students (t = 2.41), decisions 
taken in the domain of “basic occupation” (t = 2.69), multiple alternative action types 
(t = 1.86), and a negative effect for feedback received within 2 minutes of making 
decisions (t = - 2.15). The R
2 from this regression equation was 0.54, F = 8.35, p < 
.001.  These results can be interpreted by stating that respondents were more open to 
the possibility that feedback could be either favorable (cell a) or unfavorable (cell b) 
in cases involving more complex, work-related decisions for which feedback was not 
expected within a short time. Moreover, this was truer for executives than students. 
Finally, an attempt was made in the retrospective questionnaire to elicit 
estimates of the kind of feedback that respondents thought they had received or would 
receive.  These student control data are similar to the ESM results concerning current 
feedback but quite different for expected feedback (see right hand side of Table 22.4).   
Confidence, feedback, and time.  What are the correlates of feedback?  First, 
recall from above that whereas participants received or expected to receive feedback 
for some 60% of their decisions, they were either “confident” or “very confident” for 
almost 70% of their decisions.  However, there was no relation between receiving or 
not receiving feedback and confidence in decisions.  At the individual level, the 
relation between feedback and confidence in decisions was statistically significant (X
2 
< .05) for only 3 of the 10 students, and for one of these respondents, the relation was 
negative.  As to the 24 executives, there was only one statistically significant relation 
(X
2 < .05).  At the group level, the correlation between confidence in decisions and 
  24receiving or expecting to receive feedback is 0.07 (ns). In addition, levels of 
confidence in decisions were both unrelated to and did not vary as a function of 
whether feedback was received shortly after making decisions (r = 0.08, ns), or much 
later (r = – 0.07, ns).  
Attempts to find relations in the data that would “explain” confidence in 
decisions taken proved unsuccessful.  On the other hand, there is a strong positive 
relation between the confidence participants have that their decisions are “right” and 
the confidence they express in the appropriateness of the feedback they receive or 
expect to receive (r = 0.77, p < .01).  This therefore raises the possibility of 
“explaining” confidence in feedback.  To what extent could this be stimulated by prior 
feelings of confidence in decisions taken and other variables?  To explore this issue, I 
regressed confidence-in-feedback on confidence-in-decisions as well as other 
variables.  As well as a positive significant effect for confidence-in-decisions (t = 
7.59), this analysis revealed a significant effect for frequency of decisions, that is, 
their “habitual” nature (t = 2.23).  The R
2 from this regression equation was 0.65, F = 
29.1, p < .001.  Whereas extreme care should be exercised in interpreting such a 
regression, it does suggest a link between confidence and the frequency of certain 
kinds of decisions; in other words, the more habitual, the more confident.
 
Discussion of results 
  The study illuminates four different but related issues. The first concerns 
differences between the decision environments of executives and students; the second 
is whether people receive feedback in respect of their decisions, and if so, how much;  
the third is expectation of feedback on decisions taken; and the fourth is the general 
topic of confidence in decision making.   A fifth issue involves differences between 
data collected concurrently (by the ESM) and retrospectively (the student controls).  
  25  The decision environment of the executives and students varied significantly 
in both content and structure.  In terms of content, students perceived the majority of 
their decisions to be private in nature (69%) whereas executives classified most of 
their decisions as professional (61%).
11 Second, even though about one third of the 
decisions of both executives and students concerned their “basic occupation,” 
executives had a further 19% in the area of professional communication as against 2% 
for the students.
12 In addition, about one quarter (27%) of the executives’ activities 
when they received the SMS messages occurred while they were engaged in some 
form of professional communication.  Indeed, communication has often beeen quoted 
as a key managerial skill (see, e.g., Goleman, 1998) and one that has to be developed 
in younger executives. To the extent that these data are representative, it suggests an 
important gap between demands in the decision making environments of executives 
and students and thus possibly why training in communication is so important for 
younger executives.   
 
  As to the structure of decisions, executives clearly saw these as more complex 
as evidenced by the fact that whereas 80% of students’ decisions were perceived to 
have a positive focus, the comparable figure for executives was 58%.  Students and 
executives also varied on reported frequency of the kinds of decisions they took.  For 
students, 60% of decisions were described as occurring frequently (whether they 
“really” thought about them or not), whereas for executives the comparable figure 
was 42% (see Table 22.2).  Both executives and students    received or expected to 
receive feedback for about 60% of their decisions. However, for executives, feedback 
was more delayed in time than it was for students. 
  An anonymous referee suggested that one possible explanation for     
differences between the inferred decision environments of executives and students 
  26could be a  reporting bias, that is, the two groups differed in what they considered 
appropriate “DA’s” (decision actions) to report. In particular, it was argued, 
executives might be reluctant to report “trivial” decisions (such as taking a coffee). 
Whereas it is hard to reject this explanation definitively, a reading of the ESM 
questionnaire responses does not suggest that the executives refrained from reporting 
“trivial” decisions. Indeed, these form a large part of their data.     
  As noted above, some 40% of decisions involved no actual or expected 
feedback. Whether this figure is high or low is unclear because, to the best of my 
knowledge, no other studies have attempted to make such an estimate on the basis of 
random samples of people’s behavior. In addition, evidence from tacit learning would 
suggest that people may not always be aware of feedback and its effects (see, e.g., 
Reber, 1993).  However, the significance of the 40% estimate is that it emphasizes the 
informational poverty of environments in which we learn about our decision making 
effectiveness. In many cases, I suspect, people simply rely on internal feelings to 
assess whether their decisions are correct – feelings that are probably based on having 
received no negative feedback in similar situations in the past. However, it should be 
clear that this strategy is liable to lead to self-fulfilling beliefs and actions.  This, in 
turn, raises the important issue of seeking means to improve the level of feedback that 
can be obtained following actions and of making people aware of this necessity 
(Hogarth, 2001). 
What kind of feedback do people expect to test the validity of their actions?  Is 
this only confirmatory in nature? First, note that for decisions for which feedback has 
already been received (the “current” category in Table 22.4), the vast majority of 
actions were accompanied by confirmatory evidence. However, given the manner in 
  27which the study was conducted, this feedback must have been received shortly after 
the actions were taken.      
As to expected feedback, students and executives do expect confirmation (cell 
a) for 22% and 15% of their decisions, respectively. However, they indicate 
significant awareness that their actions could also result in negative or 
disconfirmatory feedback.  Indeed, more than half (56%) of all the executive feedback 
falls in the expected a and b category. (The figure for students is 36%.) There is also 
occasional, albeit minimal reference to potential evidence from cells c and d.  
Curiously, some 9% of the feedback executives claimed they would receive was 
“unobservable.” 
The overall picture that emerges from these data does not match a stereotype 
where people only think of confirming evidence.  Both executives and students are 
clearly aware that not all actions will result in positive feedback.  However, 
participants don’t always indicate that they know what feedback is appropriate to 
assessing the validity of the actions they have taken.   
 Of course, in the present work there are no data that can test whether the 
levels of confidence exhibited by the participants are justified.  A priori, the lack of a 
direct relation between feedback and confidence is some cause for concern.  Do 
participants really discriminate between situations where they are or are not 
“justified” in expressing confidence?  As speculated by Einhorn and Hogarth (1978), 
the mere fact of making judgments and decisions without receiving direct 
disconfirming evidence may be sufficient to both create and sustain feelings of 
confidence. In addition, illusions of confidence may sometimes have beneficial effects 
in that they encourage taking positive actions across time (cf., Taylor & Brown, 1988; 
1994).  A critical issue raised, therefore, by this research is to determine the bases on 
  28which people establish feelings of confidence in the decisions they take. Two 
important sources of data not considered here are, first, people’s individual histories 
for certain types of decisions,
13 and second, possible individual differences in general 
levels of confidence.  
The task given to the students who completed the retrospective questionnaire 
was not easy and thus the fact that responses were different from the concurrent ESM 
data should not be surprising.  The most interesting differences concerned confidence 
and feedback.  In the retrospective study, students reported being more confident in 
their decisions than their ESM counterparts, receiving more feedback, and, on 
average, receiving feedback with greater delays.  Whereas above I interpreted the 
difference in confidence as contradicting research in the calibration paradigm that 
would lead to expecting the opposite finding (i.e., that retrospective would be less 
confident than concurrent, cf. Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991), I caution 
against emphasizing this result.  First, it should be replicated in a study were both 
retrospective and concurrent data are collected from the same participants. Second, 
the real interest in the difference between concurrent and retrospective data in the 
present research is to demonstrate that they do not lead to the same results (cf. 
Ericsson & Simon, 1984; McFarlane, Martin, & Williams, 1988). 
Conclusions 
To the best of my knowledge, no other studies have used the ESM 
methodology for examining decision behavior.  Thus, there are no benchmarks for 
considering the results reported in this study.  For example, should we be surprised 
that participants receive or expect to receive feedback on about 60% of their 
decisions, or that they are confident about 70%? What do these estimates imply in 
terms of how the people acquire decision making skills?  Given that this is the first 
  29ESM study on decision making, I limit myself here to its promise for studying further 
aspects of decision behavior.  I first consider some methodological issues,
 and then 
turn to substantive ones. 
In terms of methodology, the present study raises a number of concerns. The 
major concern can be summarized under the heading of selection biases.  It was clear 
that not all executive participants were able to complete the task in the manner 
requested.  This therefore raises the possibility that only executives with certain kinds 
of decision environments could complete the demands of the study and the question 
of how to overcome this problem in future studies. Jobs undoubtedly differ in the 
extent to which they allow executives to be more or less available to respond to 
questionnaires when they receive SMS messages. In addition, the effort needed to 
respond to each message can be a barrier.  Some suggestions to overcome these 
difficulties include reducing the number of days over which studies are conducted 
and/or the number of messages sent per day.  Simplification of the questionnaires is 
also a possibility.  For example, questions could possibly be designed in more of a 
check-list format.  In addition, it may be feasible to enlist technology to help facilitate 
the process. For example, a couple of executives in the present study transformed the 
questionnaire into a spreadsheet and used this to record responses.  Specially 
programmed pocket computers have been used to collect data in other ESM studies 
(see, e.g., Teuchmann, Totterdell, & Parker, 1999). The use of such technology also 
increases the feasibility of being able to ask people different questions on different 
occasions and/or being able to tailor questions to prior responses on a real-time basis. 
A second form of selection bias centers on which particular decisions 
participants chose to report. In this study, participants were requested to focus on the 
decision action that was closest in time to the moment the message was received.  
  30However, this instruction still left much leeway to the participants to select or avoid 
specific types of decisions. For example, although both groups reported that some 
16% to 23% of their decisions were taken “without really thinking,” my guess is that 
the real percentage could be much higher.  One way of assessing the seriousness of 
this bias could be to have participants “shadowed” by an investigator as in Brunswik’s 
(1944) study.    It would be the investigator’s task to “audit” the decisions reported by 
the participant. Although expensive, this could possibly be done on a small sample 
basis. 
It would, of course, be naïve to believe that the ESM is the  solution to 
methodological problems in research on decision making.  No methodology owns the 
truth.  Clearly, the ESM has great potential but this potential is most likely to be 
realized when it is used in conjunction with other approaches.   For example, ESM 
could be used as an adjunct measurement tool in studies of so-called “naturalistic” 
decision making (cf., Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu & Salas, 2001).  It is also easy to 
imagine it as a supplement to questionnaires such as used in studies of consumer 
behavior or social psychology.  Its greatest value, however, would seem to be its 
ability to calibrate the frequency of behaviors that have been identified by other 
means and to assess the kinds of samples of situations that people experience in their 
natural environments.  We all know, for example, that we do not receive feedback on 
all of our decisions. However, how often does this occur?  How does this vary 
according to different conditions, that is, by persons and/or environments? And how 
important is this?  
In terms of substance, what this study has achieved, inter alia, is a glimpse 
into the decision environments of groups of executives and students. It will therefore 
be important to replicate the present study with different populations and to develop 
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would be intriguing to investigate differences between people with varying levels of 
experience in specific occupations or people with different functional responsibilities.  
As to future studies, several questions would seem well-suited to the ESM.  
One is the relation between mood or emotions and types of decision taken. To what 
extent do people use different ways of making decisions when they are in “good” or 
“bad” moods?  Mood has often been a dependent variable in ESM work and can be 
measured quite easily (see, e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).  However, is it related to 
confidence in decisions made or the kind of information that people might expect as 
feedback?  Can one detect a relation between mood and risk-taking in people’s 
naturally occurring environments (cf. Isen, 1993)?  A further topic concerns how 
people make decisions, for example, analytically, using specific heuristics, through 
feelings and intuitions, or some combination of the preceding.  Assuming that one 
could teach people how to classify decisions just taken, it would be intriguing to learn 
more about the frequencies of different “methods” as well as their correlates, for 
example, confidence, perceived risk, and so on.  One difficulty, of course, with the 
present approach is that it is difficult to assess whether people are or are not taking 
“good” decisions.  Finding ways to assess this represents a daunting challenge for 
future research. 
 A criticism of the present study could be that most of the approximately 1,200 
decisions examined had trivial consequences and could thus be dismissed as 
irrelevant.  It is important to recognize, however, that life’s consequences do not 
depend solely on how people make important decisions but may be more significantly 
affected by the cumulative effects of small and seemingly irrelevant decisions.  There 
are two reasons.  First, the sheer size of the cumulative consequences of trivial 
  32decisions can be huge. Second, even though people may use somewhat different 
processes when making important as opposed to trivial decisions, the former are 
undoubtedly affected by the latter. It is difficult to suspend habits or routines that have 
built up over years of experience.  Indeed, a case could be made that even incremental 
improvements in the manner in which people make small, everyday decisions could 
have huge effects on the outcomes they experience in life (see also Hogarth, 2001). 
In conclusion, the present study demonstrates the feasibility of using the ESM 
to study decision behavior.  Clearly, it cannot examine all issues that have been 
studied by other research methods.  However, it can illuminate the kinds of decision 
environments that people really experience and thereby clarify possible 
misconceptions of what is involved in ongoing, everyday decision making.  In other 
words, what are the samples of tasks that constrain responses of “intuitive 
statisticians”?  Moreover, the ESM can help researchers sample decision making 
behaviors in ways that can illuminate what is and what is not important. For example, 
it has been argued that judgmental “biases” can be the result of “heuristic” strategies 
that are generally useful (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). However, how often do 
people encounter situations in which heuristics are dysfunctional? As this chapter 
demonstrates, we have the means to sample people, behavior, and circumstances and 
thus to answer these kinds of questions by achieving a more accurate understanding of 
the natural ecology of decision making.  
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(Fontainebleau, France).   
♣ The author is ICREA Research Professor at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona.  
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Cojuharenco, Klaus Fiedler, Peter Juslin, Jochen Reb, and an anonymous reviewer.  
Contact address: robin.hogarth@upf.edu   
1 See also the discussion in Goldstein et al. (2001), pp. 186-187. 
2 By “size constancy” is meant the ability of the perceptual system to see objects as 
having approximately constant size despite the fact that their projection onto the retina 
varies as a function of distance and other conditions.
   
3 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting that this study be conducted to 
complement results from the ESM. 
4 Both groups of executives received feedback in the form of a report summarizing 
results of the study. The author also volunteered to hold a meeting at which the results 
could be discussed. At the time of writing, this had not yet occurred. 
5 Copies of the instructions and the questionnaires as well as the coding scheme for 
qualitative data (see below) may be obtained from the author. 
6 The second group of students is, of course, not a control group in the accepted use of 
this term (i.e., allocation of participants to the first and second groups was not made at 
random). What the second group does represent is simply a number of students drawn 
from the same population as those who participated in the ESM study. In a future 
  34study, it would be of interest to replicate the present experiments by allocating 
respondents at random to the two groups. 
7 This does not, of course, have to be the case because participants (and particularly 
the executives) varied in the number of responses they provided. 
8 Here, as in other cases where qualitative responses were provided, I report the initial 
inter-coder agreement rate on classification (i.e., prior to the reaching of a consensus). 
9 All comparisons between the distributions of responses of the student controls and 
the data collected concurrently from the students in the ESM study are significantly 
different (using X
2 tests, p < .01). 
10 This “outlier” was a 28-year old graduate student and quite different from the 
undergraduate population. Incidentally, statistical tests of any differences between the 
distributions of responses of students and executives on this question revealed no 
significant differences irrespective of whether the outlier was included. 
11 An anonymous referee correctly noted that comparisons between executives and 
students might be biased because the times for which the two groups were sampled 
were not identical (9 am to 7 pm, Mondays through Fridays, for the executives; and 9 
am to 9 pm, Mondays through Saturdays, for the students). To assess this bias, the 
data from all messages sent to students after 7 pm and on Saturdays were eliminated. 
Across all questions, the differences between the original data (i.e., all responses) and 
responses left after eliminating the non-comparable subset were minimal.  The only 
differences that might merit attention were that the subset of data indicated that more 
time was spent on “basic occupation” (46% vs. 41%) and, correspondingly, more 
decisions were professional in nature (31% vs. 26%).  If anything, these results are the 
opposite of what one might expect (presumably the subset contained less leisure time 
for the students). To conclude, there might well be important differences between how 
  35the executives and students responded to the SMS messages. However, such 
differences can not be attributed to the different times during which responses were 
elicited. 
12 Note too, that even if one sums the categories of professional and personal 
communication, the executives both spend more time involved in this activity than the 
students (31.7% vs. 6.7%) and take relatively more decisions (23.5% vs. 11.6%). 
13 It was, of course, possible to categorize the data collected by domains of 
applications and comparative frequencies of decisions (see Tables 22.1 and 22.2). 
However, neither of these categories is sufficient to characterize a person’s decision 
making history for kinds of decisions. 
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    Table 22.1 -- Current activities and domains 
    of decisions   
     
     
    Executives 
     
    Domain  of Current  Domain of Current 
    decisions* activity decisions   activity   
    %  %
1. Basic occupation ***  217 208 36  34
2. Professional communication  117 169 19  27
3. Eating and drinking    61 52 10  8
4. Housework, personal time and funds management  93 49 15  8
5. Transportation    25 48 4  8
6. Personal communication  27 27 4  4
7. Acquiring information  11 22 2  4
8. Entertainment and sports  14 16 2  3
9. Sleep, rest, recreation  20 15 3  2
10. Developing additional skills  7 11 1  2
11. Personal hygiene, beautification, dressing  13 2 2  0
12. Ethics    6 0 1 0
    611 619   
     
     
    Students 
     
    Domain  of Current   Domain  of Current Activities
    Decisions** activity   decisions   activity   of  controls
    %  % %
1. Basic occupation ***  173 243 30  41 30
2. Eating and drinking    107 95 18  16 12
3. Sleep, rest, recreation    50 56 9  10 14
4. Housework, personal time and funds management  61 39 10  7 4
5. Transportation    26 38 4  6 7
6. Personal communication  60 36 10  6 8
7. Entertainment and sports  26 22 4  4 7
8. Developing additional skills  19 32 3  5 3
9. Personal hygiene, beautification, dressing  29 10 5  2 4
10. Acquiring information  17 11 3  2 6
11. Professional communication  13 6 2  1 2
12. Ethics      1 0 0 0 3
    582 588  
     
     
* inter-coder agreement: 76%.   
**  inter-coder agreement: 81%.   
*** the data are ordered by frequency of current activity   
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     Table 22.2 -- Characteristics of decisions  
       
    
    
    
      
     Executives Students Total Executives Students  
Action type         %  %
 Positive  focus  358 453 811 58  80
 Negative  focus  36 27 63 6  5
 Multiple  alternatives  218 89 307 36 16
  612* 569** 1.181  
     Student 
     controls 
Orientation   %
 Professional  375 153 528 61  26 28
 Private  222 397 619 36  69 56
 Both  15 28 43 2 5 16
   612 578 1.190  
    
Frequency: Was this something that you do  
Frequently and without really thinking?  99 134 233 16  23 34
Frequently but you do think about it?  161 213 374 26  37 45
From time to time?  197 122 319 32  21 12
Rarely?   96 80 176 16  14 6
This was the first time!  58 34 92 9 6 3
   611 583 1.194  
    
    
Confidence in the "right" decision  
Very confident  189 203 392 31  35 42
Confident 232 181 413 38  31 32
Somewhat confident  150 77 227 25  13 16
Not confident  35 103 138 6  18 7
Not at all confident  6 20 26 1 3 3
   612 584 1.196  
    
* inter-coder agreement: 90%.   
** inter-coder agreement: 93%.   
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  Table 22.3 -- Feedback: time and confidence 
    
    
    
    
     Student 
 Executives Students Total Executives Students controls 
        % % %
                 
Feedback    
Yes 395  305 700 65 52  70
No 217 279 496 35 48 30
 612 584 1.196  
                 
Time until feedback                
Less than 2 minutes  80  96 176 20 32  17
2  t o  5  m i n u t e s   3   3611   8
5 to 15 minutes  16  31 47 4 10  4
15 to 45 minutes  17  35 52 4 12  11
45 to 90 minutes  18  13 31 5 4  8
90 minutes to 3 hours  8  21 29 2 7  7
3 hours to 15 hours  24  21 45 6 7  5
15 hours to 2 days  21  12 33 5 4  15
2 days to 1 week  30  9 39 8 3  7
1 week to 1 month  56  21 77 14 7  8
More than 1 month  81  40 121 21 13  11
Indeterminate 41 2 43 10 1 0
   395 304 699      
    
Confidence in feedback                
Very confident  179  119 298 46 40  35
Confident 130  102 232 33 34  32
Somewhat  confident  77 26 103 20 9 23
Not confident  6  43 49 2 15  7
Not at all confident  0 6 6 02  3
   392 296 688      
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   Table 22. 4 -- Type of feedback    
    
    
    
    
     Student   
   Executives* Students** Total Executives Students controls***
          %  % %
Classification                     
     Unobservable     36 9 45 9  3 0
    
     Current  Cell a  60 88 148 14  29 22
   C e l l  b   1 890   39
   C e l l  c   1 010   00
   C e l l  d    4 151   00
    
     Expected  Cell a  61 67 128 15  22 35
   C e l l  b   9 1 22 1 2   41 7
   C e l l  c   2 130   01
   C e l l  d   4 481   11
 Cell a or b  233 110 343 56  36 12
   Cell c or d  7 6 13 2 2 1
      418 306 724      
                    
                 
                 
                  
*  inter-coder agreement: 78%                
** inter-coder agreement: 79%                
*** responses normalized to 
facilitate comparisons 
        
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
 








Figure 1 – Types  of  feedback 
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* This could mean that another action was taken as opposed to no action 
having been taken. 
 
 
 
 